States across the country are taking steps towards providing digital identities to beneficiaries of their public distribution systems. In doing so, the use of Aadhaar-based biometrics seems to be the preferred choice of method. However, several other methods exist for the same and have been adopted by different states at different points in time. States currently embarking on the journey of providing digital identities to their beneficiaries might benefit from evaluating all available alternatives before adopting a suitable method.
T he Indian public distribution system (PDS) has witnessed several technology-driven performance improvement initiatives over the last decade. The main motivation behind these initiatives is twofold-reduce leakage of grains into the open market, currently estimated at roughly 42% of total grains disbursed through PDS (Drèze and Khera 2015) and ensure better availability of grains to genuine benefi ciaries. One such performance improvement initiative adopted by several states is using digital identities to authenticate benefi ciaries. With the advent of Aadhaar (India's unique biometric identity project), states are increasingly adopting Aadhaar-based biometrics to authenticate benefi ciaries. This adoption has faced severe criticism from both researchers and activists, on the grounds of the method's cost-effi ciency and performance (Khera 2011b (Khera , 2017 Drèze 2017; Press Trust of India 2017; Dang 2017; Ramaswami and Kotwal 2018) . Therefore, it is important to note that there exist other methods that can achieve similar outcomes. In fact, these other methods have been adopted by states such as Chhattisgarh, Gujarat and Karnataka at different points in time.
In this article, we analyse these other methods to identify possible alternatives to Aadhaar-based biometric authentication. We present a conceptual framework to classify the different methods along three dimensions-(i) mode of authentication, biometric or non-biometric, (ii) source of authentication, central database-connected through internet or locally stored data in the point of sale (ePoS) device, and (iii) frequency of authentication, at every transaction or once for a predefi ned number of transactions. These methods are qualitatively evaluated for their effi cacy in decreasing grain leakages and ensuring better availability of grains. The evaluation is done separately for two steps involved in the process of benefi ciaries receiving their entitlements-fi rst, the registration step where the benefi ciary is enrolled into the PDS and second, the transaction step where the benefi ciary claims their monthly entitlement from a Fair Price Shop (FPS).
While rigorous quantitative impact evaluations are needed, our analysis suggests that most benefi ts in performance improvement can be achieved by using biometric identifi cation during the registration step. Mandating benefi ciaries to provide their biometrics at the time of transaction is not necessary. For the transaction step, we show that different combinations of mode, source and frequency of authentication can be chosen based on the prevailing contextual realities, such as the budget available for implementation and maturity of infrastructure. Given that several states are venturing into providing digital identities to their benefi ciaries, this article aims to lay out various options beyond Aadhaar-based biometrics.
Background
The PDS in India has witnessed several technology-enabled performance improvement initiatives over the last decade. Typically driven by the state governments, these measures are aimed at reducing the leakage of subsidised grains into the open market and ensuring better grain availability to genuine benefi ciaries. Examples of these measures include the installation of global positioning system devices on trucks carrying foodgrains in Tamil Nadu, intimation of the grain arrival status to benefi ciaries through SMS in Chhattisgarh and automated online allocation of grains to the FPS in Gujarat (Ramaswami and Murugkar 2015) . The Government of India (GoI) also provides regular fi nancial and policy design support for such measures, a recent example being the fi nancial support provided to install ePoS devices at all FPSs (Food Supplies and Consumer Welfare Department 2015).
Studies have observed a reduction in the percentage of grains leaked into the open market in the states following these measures (Himanshu 2013; Drèze and Khera 2011) . Interestingly, these improvements were observed in states that traditionally had a poorly performing PDS such as Bihar, West Bengal, Chhattisgarh and Odisha. A key technology-enabled initiative undertaken by several states is the transition from using paper ration cards to digital ration cards. Use of digital ration cards is expected to provide enhanced visibility at a transaction level, thereby increasing the transparency and acc ountability of the PDS.
Since the inception of the Unique Identifi cation Authority of India (UIDAI) in 2009, the GoI has been championing the digitisation of ration cards and the use of Aadhaar number in the process of doing so. Presently, the government has directed states to link existing ration cards with the Aadhaar numbers of benefi ciaries and the Aadhaar number is made mandatory for obtaining a new ration card. The former is also called Aadhaar seeding. Further, the UIDAI has also recommended the collection of benefi ciary biometrics, as a mode of authen tication for purchasing grains at the FPS (UIDAI 2010). The collected biometric images are to be verifi ed against a central database of biometrics called the Central Identities Data Repository (CIDR), for authentication. Andhra Pradesh and Haryana have already implemented the UIDAI-recommended method and are being followed closely by Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Odisha and Gujarat, among other states.
This increasing adoption of the UIDAI recommended-method by states has been criticised by several scholars and activists. The criticism is primarily centred on the method's potential to overcome observed ineffi ciencies in the PDS and its costeffi ciency while doing so. In fact, noted economists R Khera (2017) and J Drèze (2016) opine that biometric authentication failures have disrupted reasonably successful systems in states that were already using some method of digital identifi cation. Issues in accessing grains arising from poor implementation, such as incomplete Aadhaar seeding, inadequate failure repor ting and backup systems, were identifi ed in Jharkhand (Menon 2017) . Transaction failures due to technical reasons, such as poor internet connectivity and ePoS machine malfunctioning, have been identifi ed in regions such as Hyderabad and Delhi Shagun and Priya 2016) . Interestingly, evidence from Jharkhand also suggests that insistence on biometric authentication may have increased corruption rather than decreasing it (Drèze et al 2017) .
Therefore, it is important to note that there are a variety of methods that can be used to provide digital identities to PDS benefi ciaries. For example, in Chhattisgarh, benefi ciaries are authenticated by swiping an electronic chip-based card, also called a smart ration card (SRC), on an ePoS device linked to a central ration card database. Gujarat used a coupon system where benefi ciaries were provided coupons that could be exchanged for grains at an FPS, post biometric verifi cation at e-governance centres, and Karnataka used benefi ciary thumbprints on a fi ngerprint capturing device that had all benefi ciary biometric images preloaded into it. 1 Figure 1 provides the details of different methods and the indicative times when they were piloted and implemented by different states. In the following sections, we describe and classify different methods that can be used during ration card registration and transaction steps, we analyse the registration and 
Figure 1: Different Methods Used by States
This figure depicts different methods of authentication used by states at different points in time. RC stands for ration card. Sources: Compiled from various sources which include: Gayatri (2015); Somashekar (2014); Kumar (nd); One World Foundation (2012); Times News Network (2017); Dsouza (2013); Bageshree (2011); Radhakrishna (2016); Puri (2017); Odishatv (2017); Omne Agate (2016); Singh (2016); Mairappan (2015) and Ram (2016) .
transaction processes to identify potential reasons for different ineffi ciencies in the system, and provide a qualitative analysis of the effi cacy of different methods in addressing the observed ineffi ciencies.
Classification of Methods
The methods used for digitally identifying PDS benefi ciaries by different states differ starkly in several aspects, such as the choice of technology, involvement of e-governance centres, and requirement of biometrics. Also, some states have used different methods in different steps involved in the process of benefi ciaries obtaining their entitlements. There are two steps involved: the registration step where the benefi ciary is enro lled into the PDS and the transaction step where the bene fi ciary claims their entitlement from the FPS. To classify the methods used to date in these steps, we develop a taxo nomy based on three parameters-mode of authentication, source of authentication and frequency of authentication.
The mode of authentication is the medium through which the benefi ciaries can identify themselves. The biometric mode of authentication captures benefi ciary fi ngerprint images and iris scans during registration, and uses them to identify a benefi ciary during transaction. In contrast, a non-biometric mode of authentication identifi es benefi ciaries using information such as name, father's name, age, address and occupation. This information along with the ration card number, number of family members and their individual details, is loaded onto a plastic card with an embedded electronic chip (SRC) and is provided to the ben e fi ciaries as a mode of authentication at the time of registration. During transaction, identi fi ca tion is done by capturing this information by swi ping the card on an ePoS machine, like a debit/credit card transaction (Soma shekar 2014; Prasad 2016).
The benefi ciary details captured through either method are verifi ed against a database, where the details of all benefi ciaries are stored. The benefi ciary details are typically added to these databases post the registration step. We call such a database the source of authentication. There are two sourcescentral databases and local databases. Central databases are typically hosted on a web server and require an internet connection to pass benefi ciary details from the ePoS machine to the servers for verifi cation. In contrast, local databases are those which are preloaded in the ePoS devices. Verification is made at the same location where the benefi ciary details are collected. The trans action details are captured in ePoS mac hines and uploaded on a central server at periodic intervals.
The frequency of authentication is the frequency at which a benefi ciary must authenticate themselves with the PDS. Benefi ciaries by default authenticate themselves for once at the time of registration. However, during transaction, benefi ciaries can either be authenticated real time at every transaction, or can be authenticated once for an aggregated number of transactions, using the coupon system. In the coupon system, benefi ciaries are issued barcoded coupons, suffi cient for a stipulated period at an e-governance centre, also called the Common Service Center (CSC). The coupons include details such as commodity, price, quantity and the associated FPS. The benefi ciary can claim their grains at their registered FPS in exchange for the coupon (Choithani and Pritchard 2015) . We call this an aggregated frequency of authentication. Given the above classifi cation, there are eight methods that are possible (two types of sources multiplied by two types of modes multiplied by two types of frequencies). For the ease of recall, we propose a chain-based nomenclature, with the mode of authentication in prefi x, source of authentication as infi x and the frequency of authentication as suffi x, for each method. For instance, the method recommended by the UIDAI will be called B-CD-RT with mode of authentication as biometrics (B), the source of authentication as CIDR, a central database (CD) and the frequency of authentication as real-time (RT). Table 1 lists these methods, their nomenclatures and states that have used/are using them in the transaction step. It is noteworthy that no state has used the methods NB-CD-AG, B-LD-AG and NB-LD-AG so far. In the following sections, we evaluate the methods described above for their ability to address prevailing ineffi ciencies in the PDS. We start with identifying a list of widely reported ineffi ciencies and analyse their root causes in the next section. 
The columns in the table (mode, source, frequency and name) categorise these different modes into a framework defined by us (mode-source-frequency). NA stands for not applicable. Sources: Same as those for Figure 1 .
Identification of Inefficiencies
Four types of ineffi ciencies are consistently reported in the PDS: (i) classifi cation errors, (ii) identity fraud, (iii) quantity fraud, and (iv) bene fi ciary dissatisfaction. Table 2 defi nes each of these ineffi ciencies. In the subsequent part of the section, we analyse both registration and transaction steps to identify the possible causes of ineffi ciencies in each process.
Registration: A typical process of registering a benefi ciary involves two stages-document submission 2 and verifi cation. Most benefi ciaries, by dint of their profession or socio-economic status, cannot produce valid proofs of identity and income. Therefore, the Department of Food and Public Dis tribution (DFPD) commonly accepts attestation by self and the gram panchayat offi cials as the proof of a benefi ciary's identity and fi nancial status. Such attestation is subject to manipulation by a multitude of factors such as coercion of attester through illegal means, nepotism, rent-seeking by attesters, and misinforming the attesters. These manipulations can result in instances of identity fraud and classifi cation errors. Examples include, attesting applications made in the name of fi ctitious benefi ciaries, applications made by non-priority households as Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY) households, applications made by households which already have a ration card 3 and applications quoting a higher family size. Instances alluding to such manipulations by people in power have been reported (Bhardwaj 2014) . The verifi cation of documents is done by ration card inspectors who physically visit the benefi ciary. Evidently, this is a time-consuming process. A study in Kerala reported approximately 6,00,000 families not being able to access PDS as their applications were waiting in the pipeline for approval by the DFPD (Masiero 2016) . Moreover, such verifi cation is subject to the same kind of manipulations as that of attestation. In addition, new instances of identity fraud and classifi cation errors can also be generated due to issues in management of the existing ration card database by the DFPD. For example, benefi ciary details may not be removed from the central database after natural events such as the death and migration of a family member. Such instances are captured through periodic manual verifi cations (Food, Civil Supplies and Consumer Protection Department 2017; Chatterjee 2014). However, studies have reported the effi cacy of such manual verifi cations being affected by political interventions and poor functioning of vigilance committees (Sharma and Gupta 2017; Khera 2011c) .
Transaction: During the transaction process, the FPS owner verifi es the ration card displayed by the benefi ciary and provides the amount of grains they are entitled to after updating their records in a register. In this process, the manual verifi cation of ration cards leaves scope for identity fraud through the shadow usage of cards. In fact, leakage of grains allocated to above poverty line (APL) cardholders is largely attributed to identity fraud of this kind (Drèze and Khera 2015) . Estimates suggest that about 56%-67% of the APL allocation was leaked during 2011-12 (Drèze and Khera 2015) . Leakage through quantity fraud and instances of dissatisfi ed benefi ciaries are also widely reported in this step (NCAER 2015). The following section will compare the above-mentioned methods descri bed for their effi cacy in addressing the possible causes of observed ineffi ciencies described above.
The following sections analyse the effi cacy of each parameter, mode, source and frequency of authentication individually, in add ressing the causes of ineffi ciencies identifi ed in the registration and transaction steps.
Registration

Mode of authentication:
The likelihood of identity fraud through submission of fake documents in the registration process is comparatively lesser when using the biometric mode. This is because the data collector or the benefi ciary will have to create fake biometrics to make such entries in the ration card database. Though reports of the creation of fake biometrics have surfaced recently (Pandey 2017) , the likelihood and prevalence of such fraud is currently very limited. Further, the related problem of identity fraud through duplicate ration card applications can also be addressed better using the biometric mode. The DFPD verifi es the applicant's demographic details against all entries in the existing ration card database.
The application is deemed as duplicate and cancelled if a match is found. This process of verifi cation is also called deduplication. In the non-biometric mode, deduplication is textbased. Different combinations of name, address, age, father's name and so on, furnished in the application, are used to fi nd if there exists a match. In contrast, biometric deduplication uses Grains claimed from the FPS through false identities such as fake/ Registration (both submission and verification) duplicate ration cards, genuine ration cards being used individuals other than the beneficiary (shadow usage of cards) Quantity fraud Quantity of grains obtained from FPS lesser than entitlement Transaction Beneficiary dissatisfaction Instances such as long wait times, shop closed during working Registration (verification), transaction hours, ration card not received on time, sexual harassment by shopowner * The National Food Security Act (NFSA) categorises households into priority households (PHH), non-priority households (NPHH) and Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY) households based on their financial status. The priority households are entitled up to 5 kilograms (kg) per person per month at the issue prices of `1, `2 and `3 per kg for rice, wheat and coarse grains, respectively. The AAY households can claim up to 35 kg of foodgrains per household per month at the price mentioned above, while the NPHH are excluded from such entitlements. Source: NCAER (2015). either benefi ciary fi ngerprints or iris scans to fi nd a match. Given that biometrics uniquely identify an individual, biometric deduplication emerges superior to that of text-based deduplication. Thus, the biometric method seems to offer a superior technological capability to address ineffi ciencies during the registration process. However, the collection, storage and maintenance of biometric data is signifi cantly more expensive. In addition, the success of either modes is partly contingent on the DFPD's ability to integrate the state's Ration Card Management System (RCMS) with data from other governmental programmes. For instance, an application made in the AAY/ Priority Households (PHH) category can be digitally verifi ed against the list of AAY and PHH identifi ed by the Ministry of Rural Development, without the need for physical verifi cation. Such integration can signifi cantly decrease benefi ciary dissatisfaction, by rationalising the need for physical verifi cation and decreasing the time taken to process an application. Benefi ts of such integration have been reported by Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan and Karnataka.
In view of this, leveraging biometric data collected during Aadhaar enrolment offers a more cost-effective alternative than the DFPDs of each state collecting their own biometrics. After all, the most cost-intensive component of this method, which is the collection, storage and maintenance of benefi ciary biometric data, is already being taken up by the UIDAI. Also, the DFPDs can leverage the ongoing Aadhaar linkage exercises with mobile number, Permanent Account Number (PAN) , savings account and so on, to enhance the robustness of their RCMS. For instance, by linking the ration card database with the benefi ciary PAN, any change in the benefi ciary's fi nancial status can be immediately refl ected in the quantity of grains they are entitled to.
Source of authentication:
To perform deduplication exercises during the registration process, the source of authentication by default needs to be a central database.
Frequency of authentication:
The frequency of authentication during the registration process is by default real time, once at the time of registration or at the time of any modifi cations requested in the card. Essentially, the choice of a method during the registration step boils down to the mode of authentication only.
Transaction
Mode of authentication:
During the transaction process, the choice of the mode of authentication can aggravate benefi ciary dissatisfaction, due to an increase in technology-based transaction failures. Drivers for such failures could be poor internet connectivity, sporadic supply of electricity, malfunctioning of the ePoS and so on. In addition to these which are common to both non-biometric and biometric modes, choosing the biometric mode can further increase the likelihood of transaction failure, due to poor quality of benefi ciary biometrics. It is established that the quality of biometrics is dependent on the age, gender and occupation of an individual (Theofanos et al 2006) .
Also, the number of attempts required to capture a good quality biometric image for authentication purposes increases with age. This means that senior citizens could either be at the risk of being denied ration for the month after the fi rst failed attempt, or at the risk of increasing the wait time for others in the queue. This is also true for daily wage labourers and farm workers, as their fi ngerprint quality deteriorates with time due to the nature of their profession. Therefore, non-biometric modes of authentication offer a more technologically robust option during the transaction process. Further, the cost of installing biometric scanners, both fi ngerprint and iris scanners, at each FPS, is higher in comparison to electronic swipe mac hines used in most non-biometric modes. 4 Though the biometric mode ensures that the person drawing grains is exactly who they are entitled to, such levels of reliability can also be achieved using smart/barcoded cards, by adding additional layers of authentication security, such as a smart card PIN number and a one-time password sent via SMS. This will particularly address the concerns of senior citizens, who have a diffi culty in commuting to provide their biometrics every month. In the non-biometric mode, their kith or kin can collect the grains and deliver them at their doorstep. Thus, contrary to the registration process, non-biometric mode seems more effective during the transaction process. Therefore, a possible way forward can be using smart cards as a mode of authentication at the time of transaction, and linking each smart card with benefi ciary biometric data in the backend, during the registration process. In this way, states can leverage the superior deduplication abilities offered by the biometric mode, while ensuring that the risk of transaction failure and cost of implementation are not signifi cantly high. This approach is being currently used by Tamil Nadu.
Source of authentication:
The choice between local and central databases is primarily driven by the quality of internet connectivity. Using central databases requires robust web communication servers and strong internet/mobile connectivity in a region. This is particularly critical at the start of the month when the number of transactions are high. Therefore, using central databases may increase the instances of transaction failure due to internet connectivity issues, thereby leading to an increase in benefi ciary dissatisfaction. 5 However, central databases provide an opportunity to continuously monitor FPS level grain inventory and quantity of grains claimed by each benefi ciary. This allows states to offer the functionality of portability to their benefi ciaries.
Through this functionality, benefi ciaries can claim their ent itlements from any FPS, in whatever quantities they please. Such functionality is expected to decrease quantity fraud and improve overall service quality of PDS, by introducing competition between FPS owners. Also, providing this functionality can ensure access to PDS entitlements to migrant workers and improve service quality at the FPSs as mentioned recently in a report from Chhattisgarh (Rajan et al 2016) . Thus, both options have different ways of decreasing benefi ciary dissatisfaction. The ideal choice of a method depends on the strength of internet connectivity and the need for portability in a region.
Frequency of authentication:
The aggregated frequency of authentication offers the states a faster and cheaper transition to using digital identities. This is because most states set up CSCs with uninterrupted supply of electricity and seamless internet connectivity, as a part of the National e-Governance Plan, launched in 2006 (OneWorld Foundation 2012 . So, instead of computerising all the FPSs and upskilling every FPS owner, the states can piggyback on existing infrastructure and know-how at these e-governance centres. Gujarat was among the fi rst states to have taken this route towards digitally authenticating PDS benefi ciaries. Given that most e-governance centres have strong internet connectivity, we do not see states using aggregated frequency of authentication with local databases as a source of authentication, as observed in the methods B-LD-AG and NB-LD-AG in Table 1 .
However, the aggregated frequency of authentication adds to instances of benefi ciary dissatisfaction, as the benefi ciaries will now have to make two trips-one to the e-governance centre for collecting coupons and another to the FPS, for collecting their grains. Grievances of long wait times and travel distances have been observed in Chhattisgarh and Odisha (Chatterjee 2014; Puri 2012) . Further, instances of FPS owners forcing the benefi ciaries to submit more coupons than required for a given quantity of grains, have also been reported (Choithani and Pritchard 2015) . Such instances further increase the likelihood of benefi ciary dissatisfaction. Thus, the choice between aggregated and real time frequency of authentication appears to be a trade-off between the resource constraints of the government and the service experience of benefi ciaries.
Unlike the registration step where the biometric mode of authentication emerged as a superior method, there is no such clear winner for the transaction step. Instead, the choice of method appears to be dependent on fi ve aspects: (i) the quality of biometrics, measured as a percentage of benefi ciaries whose biometrics pass the UIDAI's fi ngerprint quality test, (ii) the quality of infrastructure, measured in terms of the frequency of inte rruptions to internet connectivity, (iii) prevailing reso urce constraints in terms of budget and time, (iv) proximity of the CSCs measured in terms of the average extra distance bene fi ciaries need to travel, if aggregated frequency of authen tication was used, and (v) the prevailing criticality of each type of ineffi ciency. Table 3 (p 35) summarises the discussion on different combinations of methods for the registration and transaction steps. Given that the assessment of these fi ve aspects is expected to be different in different regions (villages/towns) of a state, governments may benefi t from taking a customised approach specifi c to each region, as opposed to taking a one-size-fi ts-all approach. For instance, states with high resource constraints can consider using aggregated frequency of authentication in urban regions, which are expected to have a high density of
CSCs. Whereas, a phased implementation of real time frequency can be considered in regions with a low density of CSCs, starting with areas where the robustness of internet connectivity is the highest. Such a customised approach to providing digital identities can prove more cost-effective and benefi ciary friendly during the transaction process.
Conclusions and Future Scope
States are increasingly adopting Aadhaar-based biometrics for providing digital identities to PDS benefi ciaries. However, this is not the only available method to provide digital identities. Several other methods exist and have been used by different states at different points in time. We identify, classify and evaluate these methods for their effi cacy of addressing PDS ineffi ciencies in the registration and transaction processes. We fi nd that despite other alternatives being available, the biometric mode of authentication seems to be more effective in the registration process. Consequently, the ongoing exercise of seeding Aadhaar numbers with ration cards is a promising step towards strengthening the states' RCMS. However, at the time of transaction, benefi ciary biometrics need not be used. During this step, the ideal choice of method depends not only on the method's effi cacy of addressing ineffi ciencies, but also on several other parameters such as the strength of internet connectivity, availability of e-governance centres and the prevailing resource constraints measured in terms of time/budget. Therefore, governments can benefi t from critically analysing their regional contexts before choosing their method. We provide the contexts in which each method works best for the governments to perform such assessments. However, more studies are needed to quantitatively assess the costs and benefi ts of each of the choices available. Examples of such studies include estimation of the value of the portability functionality offered by central databases and comparative cost-benefi t analysis of biometric deduplication, in relation to deduplication using other approaches such as regular physical visits. Such studies can signifi cantly help states such as West Bengal, Assam and Maharashtra, that are considering the use of digital identities in PDS, make an informed choice on the method best suited for their needs.
Notes 1 This information was gathered during our fi eld visits and interviews with Karnataka Food and Civil Supplies Corporation Limited offi cials. 2 Benefi ciaries submit a duly fi lled and attested application form, along with one government identifi cation and attested proof of income. The application form typically contains information such as name, age, occupation, fi nancial status, address, number of family members and their individual details. 3 Ideally, such instances are supposed to be checked by mandate to produce a valid government identifi cation proof. However, circulation of duplicate/fake government identifi cation in India is common. 4 The calculation is based on the prices of biometric scanners and smart readers quoted by multiple sources. The price of a smart card reader was taken from Indiamart (2019a) and that for a biometric scanner set was obtained from Indiamart (2019) . 5 The supply of electricity should also be considered in context. However, given that most of the ePoS devices and biometric scanners can be operated on solar/local battery power, we believe this issue can be easily resolved.
